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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that the negligence claims 
of Plaintiffs/Appellants (the "Stampers") against Defendant/Appellee Rebecca 
Johnson ("Ms. Johnson") are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Utah 
Worker's Compensation Act because Ms. Johnson and the Stampers' decedent, 
Sharon Stamper ("Ms. Stamper"), were co-employees under the fellow servant 
doctrine at the time of the accident giving rise to the claims. 
Preservation of Issue: The parties preserved this issue by Ms. Johnson's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and memorandum in support [R. at 55-70], 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment [R. at 135-138], and Ms. Johnson's Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. at 167-177.] 
Standard of Review: The trial court's order of summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness, and the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party Orvis v. 
1 
Tohnson, 2008 UT 2, 1f 6, 177 E3d 600 (citations omitted). The trial court's 
interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correctness. Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT 
76, If 5, 31 P.3d 537. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l), is determinative, or of central importance 
to this appeal. That section provides: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to this 
chapter for injuries sustained by an employee, whether 
resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy 
against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any . . . employee of the employer and the 
liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter shall be 
in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at 
common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the 
employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, 
next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or 
any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, 
sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the 
course of or because of or arising out of the employee's 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained 
against an employer or against any officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer based upon any accident, 
injury, or death of an employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l)(2005). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
This appeal is from an Order of the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
Washington County, Utah, granting Ms. Johnson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. [R. at 202-206.] 
Statement of Facts 
This case arises from a single car rollover accident which occurred on Friday, 
May 6, 2005, on the highway between Toquerville, Utah, and Mesquite, Nevada. 
[R. at 63.] The accident killed Stamper's decedent, Ms. Stamper, and severely 
injured Ms. Johnson. [R. at 69.] 
On the date and time of the accident, Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were 
both employed by Steve and Cyndi Gilbert through two separate corporate entities. 
[R. at 63 and 69.] Ms. Stamper was paid by Gilbert Development Corporation 
("GDC"), and Ms. Johnson was paid by Diamond G Rodeos, Inc. ("Diamond G"). 
[14] 
Both GDC and Diamond G are closely held corporations owned and 
managed by Mr. Gilbert, who also owns related entities Crusher Rental & Sales, 
Inc. ("CRS") and Diamond "G" Ranch (the "Ranch") located in Toquerville, 
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Utah. [Id; R. at 76.] Mr. Gilbert's wife, Cyndi Gilbert, is an attorney and serves 
as corporate counsel for GDC. [R. at 76]. 
Mr. Gilbert described Ms. Johnson's job duties as a "gofer" who reported to 
Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert on a daily basis for job assignments: 
Q [By Mr. Sutterfield] Okay. And what was her [Ms. Johnson's] title or 
duties and job description? 
A [By Mr. Gilbert] Well, I don't think she had a tide. If I'd tide her, I'd 
call her gofer. . . . She went for that and gofer that. Go here, go 
there. She helped us with the rodeos, the ranching, helping me with 
faxing, and basically just anything you needed done. . . . 
Q Okay I understand you're her [Johnson's] ultimate boss. Is there 
someone that supervised her work on a day to day basis? 
A Me. . . . [U] Well, there again, it depends on, one, if I'm here. Then 
she would report to my wife [Cyndi Gilbert]. And secondly, if I or if 
we happen to be out of town, we'd leave her what my wife calls a 
to-do list of things that needed to be accomplished. 
[R. at 67-68.] 
Similarly, Ms. Johnson testified: CCI pretty much did anything Steve [Gilbert] 
needed me to do, whether it was with Diamond G Rodeos or Gilbert 
Development, anything that had to do with animals, helping with construction at 
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his new house, running . . . general business errands for Steve and/or for Cyndi 
[Gilbert].55 [R. at 67.] 
Ms. Stamper performed primarily cooking and cleaning duties for GDC. [R. 
at 67.] Although Ms. Johnson and Ms. Stamper were paid by different entities and 
had different skill sets, Mr. Gilbert testified that there was "continuous crossover55 
between the corporate entities Ms. Johnson and Ms. Stamper did work for: 
Q [By Mr. Sutterfield] When I say you, I understand you made it clear 
she [Ms. Stamper] worked for Gilbert Development Corporation? 
A Yes, and overlapped into all the other corporations somehow or 
another at times. 
A I don't think that when you say "I work for Gilbert Development55 
that means she [Ms. Johnson] wasn't on their payroll. She never 
received a payroll check. I will say that she [Ms. Johnson] did Gilbert 
Development chores or intermediate stuff periodically all the time, but 
she got paid by Diamond G Rodeos. But there was continuous 
crossover. There is today and always will be with any employees. 
[R. at 66-67.] 
Mr. Gilbert went on to testify that although the two women worked for 
different entities and had some different duties cc[t]here was overlap all time.55 [R. 
at 66.] For example, when Ms. Stamper cooked for large corporate functions, 
Ms. Johnson "would certainly jump in and help . . . with whatever [Ms. Stamper] 
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needed." [Id] Ms. Johnson testified that "I would assist Sharon [Stamper] 
sometimes in cleaning the house and running errands for Cyndi [Gilbert]. . . . [TJ 
As for . . . working side by side, that's pretty much it, Steve, Cyndi, myself, and 
Sharon [Stamper]." [R. at 126.] 
As the district court noted and as the Stampers do not dispute on appeal, 
"while Plaintiffs list a number of duties that Ms. Johnson performed that were 
outside of Ms. Stamper's expertise, it is not controverted that GDCs business was 
often mixed with Diamond G, and Diamond G's with that of GDC." [R. at 204.] 
More crucially to the issues presented by this appeal, Mrs. Gilbert described 
what the two employees were doing, and for which corporate entity, during the 
week immediately preceding, and then on the day of, the accident. By unrebutted 
affidavit, she states as follows: 
2. I am an attorney, licensed to practice law in the State of Utah 
and have done so since 1985. I am corporate counsel for Gilbert 
Development Corporation ("GDC"), an entity owned and managed by my 
husband Steve M. Gilbert, who also owns related entities including Crusher 
Rental & Sales, Inc. ("CRS"), Diamond "G" Rodeos ("Diamond G"), and 
Diamond "G" Ranch (the "Ranch"). 
3. During 2004 and 2005, my husband and I spent a majority of 
our time in Mesquite, Nevada finishing a residential subdivision project, 
Vista Del Monte ("VDM"), which Steve had purchased from the original 
lender after the original developer filed for bankruptcy. 
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4. GDC had completed approximately 1.5 million dollars worth of 
earth-moving and underground utilities work on the VDM Project that had 
not been paid when the original developer filed for bankruptcy protection 
and invoked the automatic stay on the project. Steve had to purchase the 
project in order to allow GDC to be paid for its past work and allow the 
VDM project to be completed. 
5. GDCs purchase of the VDM subdivision raised many legal and 
logistical issues that required the immediate attention of Steve, myself and 
the individuals who worked closely to assist us in our day to day activities -
especially Rebecca (Becky) Johnson (now Bradford) [Ms. Johnson] and 
Sharon Stamper [Ms. Stamper]. The unexpected development project 
presented a number of logistical problems. 
6. Steve and I owned a home in Mesquite on North Lakeview 
with a small "home office.55 The acquisition of the large VDM project made 
that office immediately too small for both Steve and I to accomplish the 
legal, development and corporate issues we were working on. Steve and I 
had built a new home within the VDM subdivision on Chaparral Drive 
primarily so that we would each have a separate office from which to work. 
7. VDM had soil problems and the original developer's engineer, 
Kleinfelder, had been sued for damages incurred to homes built on the site. 
Depositions were scheduled for Kleinfelder executives on Tuesday May 10, 
2005, in my new Mesquite home/office on Chaparral. 
8. Because of these depositions and other business, it was 
imperative that my new office in the Chaparral Drive home be ready for my 
use by May 6th in order to prepare for the coming Kleinfelder depositions. 
9. Friday, May 6, 2005, was to have been a "finish-up" day for 
moving from our previous home in Mesquite to the new home/office in the 
VDM subdivision. During the week of May 2nd- 5th either Steve or myself 
assigned [Ms. Johnson] a number of tasks in Mesquite, and those which I 
recall included: 
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a. assisting me in getting Pacer up and running so we could 
do some legal research on the GDC California fraudulent conveyance 
case; 
b. getting the office telephone system up and running in our 
Chaparral Drive offices; 
c. teaching Steve and I how to use the telephone system 
once it was installed; 
d. picking up an "architectural variance55 from the VDM 
Homeowners5 Association for Steve's review and requested approval; 
e. determining what light bulbs would work only in our 
ccold55 house and leaving them at that home while bringing extra light 
bulbs that would work in the ccnew55 home/office to that home; 
f. ordering flowers for a executive of Sun-Cor (the entity 
GDC was currently working for at Coral Canyon, Washington, Utah) 
who had just had surgery; 
g. transporting mail and files to and from Toquerville; 
h. transporting legal supplies (bate stamp, discovery 
looseleafs, boxes for shipping, etc.) to the Mesquite office; 
i. handling logistical issues for the rodeo (i.e. acquisition of 
judging sheets from past rodeo/buU riding events, locating pictures of 
independent contractors for publicity, verifying hotel reservations for 
the Diamond CCG55 crew, etc.); and 
j . working with Steve as his emergencies required. 
10. We had also sent [Ms. Stamper] to Mesquite during that week 
of May 2nd - 5th. [Ms. Stamper] had been working with my mother in 
cleaning the previous home and transporting items to the new home/office. 
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[Ms. Stamper] had also been irreplaceable in helping me set up the my new 
office so that it would be ready for the Kleinfelder depositions the coming 
Tuesday. While [Ms. Stamper] worked for us, she also ran errands, picked 
up the mail, and did whatever was asked of her to help make our life easier. 
Among other things, [Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson] were to ensure that a 
carpet cleaner was retrieved from the North Lakeview house for use at the 
house on Chaparral Drive, take a mirror and other items out of the Lakeview 
house and install a key box at the Chaparral Drive house. 
11. The accident occurred on Friday, May 6th 2005. On that day, 
[Ms. Johnson and Ms. Stamper] were again coming from Toquerville to 
Mesquite at my direction to finish the tasks necessary to complete the office 
move. [Ms. Johnson and Ms. Stamper] often traveled together in company 
vehicles, and were driving a vehicle owned by GDC at the time of the 
accident. 
12. . . . On May 6, 2005, the two employees were together and 
traveling to Mesquite for the benefit of GDC and the VDM project. Both 
employees were to be working in Mesquite that day primarily because of 
issues arising from the office move, and both would have worked there until 
the job was finished. 
[R. at 72-76.] 
The accident occurred while the two employees were traveling to Mesquite, 
approximately 10 minutes after they had left the Toquerville location. 
Ms. Stamper's sister, Judy Bradshaw, made a workers5 compensation claim and 
received workers5 compensation benefits from the Workers5 Compensation Fund on 
behalf of Ms. Stamper's Estate. [R. at 49-50, 60.] 
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The Stamper's filed their Complaint on February 12, 2007, alleging that 
Ms. Johnson negligendy drove the GDC vehicle too fast for the existing conditions, 
which negligence caused Ms. Stamper's death. [R. at 2-6.] 
After a period in which the parties conducted discovery, Ms. Johnson filed 
her Motion for Summary Judgment on June 30, 2006. [R. at 46-47.] She argued 
that Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were co-employees under the fellow servant 
doctrine, and as a result, the Stampers' claims were barred by the exclusive remedy 
provision contained in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l). [R. at 49-70.] 
The trial court entered its Order Granting Ms. Johnson's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on December 11, 2008. [R. at 202-206.] It is from this 
Order that the Stampers appeal. [R. at 207-208.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Stampers' claims against Ms. Johnson are barred under the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act because at the 
time of the accident Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were co-employees working for 
Cyndi Gilbert and GDC. Although Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were paid by 
different corporate entities, the undisputed facts demonstrate that at the time of the 
accident, Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were co-employees, working on a common 
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project for a common employer. Thus, the Stampers' right to recover Worker's 
Compensation benefits from GDC is the Stampers' exclusive remedy and their 
claims against Ms. Johnson are barred under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STAMPERS5 CLAIMS AGAINST MS. JOHNSON ARE 
BARRED BY THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF THE 
UTAH WORKERS5 COMPENSATION ACT BECAUSE THE TWO 
EMPLOYEES WERE CO-EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO THE 
FELLOW-SERVANT DOCTRINE. 
This Court has made clear that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act "is 
intended not only to compensate employees for job-related injuries, but also to 
protect them against liability for job-related conduct." Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Manning. 1999 UT 77,1f 21, 985 P.2d 243. "The protection against suit provided 
by this [exclusive remedy] section extends to any employee." Utah Home Fire Ins. 
Co., H 21 (emphasis original). Put simply if an employee is injured during the 
course of her employment by a fellow employee, Worker's Compensation benefits 
are her exclusive remedy and she is precluded from pursuing damages from her 
fellow employee. Id 
This court has long recognized the policy that "the Worker's Compensation 
Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes." Utah Home Fire Ins. 
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Co., 11 18. Consistent with that policy this Court has stated that it is "proper to 
resolve doubt as to whether a worker was an employee in favor of [the worker 
being] an employee.55 I d ; quoting Bennett v. Indus. Common, 726 P.2d 427, 430 
(Utah 1986). "It would indeed be inconsistent to resolve doubts in favor of a 
worker being considered an employee when the worker is seeking coverage but not 
in other situations, such as here, where the worker is being sued by another 
employee.55 I d 
In the instant case, the trial court correctly concluded that the undisputed 
material facts demonstrate that the Stampers5 claims against Ms. Johnson are barred 
under section 34A-2-105(l) because Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were co-
employees when the subject accident occurred. [R. at 202-06.] 
A, Ms. Stamper And Ms. Johnson Were Co-employees at the Time 
Of The Accident Pursuant to the Fellow-servant Doctrine. 
This Court has defined "fellow servants55 as individuals: 
engaged in the same line of work and labor together in 
such personal relations that they can exercise an influence 
upon each other promotive of proper caution in respect 
of their mutual safety They should be at the time of the 
injury directly operating with each other in the particular 
business at hand, or they must be operating so that 
mutual duties bring them into such co-association that 
they may exercise an influence upon each other to use 
proper caution and be so situated in their labor to some 
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extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of 
each other as to skill, diligence and carefulness. 
Peterson v. Fowler. 493 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1972); in accord Bambrough v. 
Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
If a fellow-servant relationship is found to exist, an injured fellow servant or 
her heirs are required to accept only worker's compensation benefits for injuries and 
cannot not maintain an action against either the employee's own actual employer or 
the employer of a fellow servant for negligence or wrongful death. Bambrough, 
552 P2d at 1293. 
Pursuant to the cases cited above, the district court found that 
cc[Ms. Johnson] and Ms. Stamper were, in carrying out the errand at Ms. Gilbert's 
direction, 'directly operating with each other in the particular business at hand.' 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Ms. Johnson and Ms. Stamper were 
engaged in the csame employment,' and [the Stampers'] claims are therefore barred 
by the exclusive remedy provision of Workers' Compensation Act." [R. at 202-
03.] 
In an effort to avoid the exclusive remedy provision, the Stamper's make an 
argument based essentially on three assertions: (1) the accident occurred while the 
employees were driving to a job site, and Ms. Stamper had no opportunity to 
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influence Ms. Johnson to use additional caution or skill in the split second before 
the accident occurred (Aplt. Br. at 10-11); (2) Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were 
paid by different corporate entities (Id at 14-15); and (3) the two employees had 
different job skills and duties. Id at 11-18. The Stamper's arguments fail under 
Utah law and the undisputed material facts. 
1. Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson Were So Situated That They 
Could Influence One Another To Use Skill And Caution 
While Accomplishing the Task in Which the Two 
Employees Were Engaged. 
The Stampers first attempt to avoid application of the exclusive remedy 
provision by arguing that "in the short instant leading to her death55 and "in the 
split second the vehicle began to slide/5 Ms. Stamper did not have the opportunity 
to influence Ms. Johnson to use additional caution or skill. Aplt. Br. at 8-11. 
Stampers also attempt to distinguish the "dangerous physical work situations55 
present in the cases the district court relied upon from the activity Ms. Johnson and 
Ms. Stamper were engaged in, which Stampers characterize as "simply carpooling 
to a common job site.55 Id However, there is no basis for the Stampers5 attempt 
to construe the holding in Peterson so narrowly 
First, the Court will note that there was no suggestion in the facts of the 
Peterson case that Mr. Peterson had the ability to influence his fellow workers to 
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use additional caution or skill in the very instant before the scaffolding fell. 
Peterson, 493 P.2d at 998. Likewise, in Bambrough, there is no indication that 
the truck driver had the ability to influence the forklift operator to use additional 
caution or skill in the split second before the forklift rolled over his leg. See 
Bambrough, 552 P.2d at 1289. In Goheen v. Yellow Freight Sys., 32 E3d 1450 
(10th Cir. 1994), it is also highly unlikely that the receiving clerk had any 
opportunity to influence the truck driver to use additional caution or skill in the 
instant before the crate fell on her. Goheen, 32 E3d at 1451. 
Moreover, Stampers have offered nothing but their own bald characterization 
to support the implication that there was anything more dangerous about the 
"physical work situations55 present in these cases than there is in driving a vehicle 
without proper use of seat belts, traveling at appropriate speeds for conditions, etc. 
In fact, whatever the task at hand the fellow-servant doctrine simply requires 
that the employees involved be ccin such personal relations that they can exercise an 
influence upon each other promotive of proper caution in respect of their mutual 
safety.55 Peterson, 493 P2d at 1000. They can be either "directly operating with 
each other in the particular business at hand, or55 in "such co-association that they 
may exercise an influence upon each other to use proper caution and be so situated 
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in their labor to some extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of 
each other as to skill, diligence and carefulness." IdL (emphasis added). 
As a factual matter, it is undisputed that on May 6, 2005, Ms. Stamper and 
Ms. Johnson were in "co-association" that required travel from Toquerville to 
Mesquite "to finish the tasks necessary to complete the office move" for 
Mrs. Gilbert and GDC.1 [R. at 73.] As the district court noted, they were 
"directly operating with each other in the particular business at hand." [R. at 202.] 
Moreover, the two were "so situated" that "to some extent" they could exercise "an 
influence" on the conduct of the "skill, diligence and carefulness" of such activities 
as where and how to load the vehicles, what route to take, use or non-use of 
seatbelts, attentiveness to the road and driving conditions, speed, etc. 
Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were thus able to "watch the conduct of each 
other," so as to be fellow servants whatever may or may not have been possible in 
the "split second" before the accident. Peterson, 493 P.2d at 1000. Indeed to 
limit the Peterson holding as Stampers suggest would defeat the purpose of the 
1
 It is also undisputed that in the six months immediately prior to the 
accident, Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson traveled between a Toquerville work site 
and a Mesquite work site approximately three to five times per week transporting 
corporate files, mail and generally assisting Mrs. Gilbert with changing office 
locations in Mesquite. [R. at 63-64; 72-74.] 
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exclusive remedy provision contrary to this Court's guidance in Utah Home Fire 
Ins. Co. Utah Home, 11 18 (ccIt would indeed be inconsistent to resolve doubts in 
favor of a worker being considered an employee when the worker is seeking 
coverage but not in other situations, such as here, where the worker is being sued 
by another employee.55). 
In this regard the Court will note that by the assertion throughout their brief 
that the two employees were "simply car pooling to a common job site55 (see Aplt. 
Br. at 10, 11, 14, 18, and 23), Stampers5 invoke a rule developed in the context of 
Worker's Compensation known as the "coming and going rule.55 Generally, an 
employee's injury does not occur in the course of employment for purposes of 
applying the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act if the injury is sustained 
while an employee is simply going to or coming from work (Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Labor Comm'n. 2007 UT 4,1f 19, 153 P.3d 179); thus Stampers impliedly 
argue that the accident did not occur during the course and scope of Ms. Stamper's 
and Ms. Johnson's employment. 
To the extent this is Stampers5 argument, it fails pursuant to the undisputed 
facts. The underlying premise of the "coming and going rule55 is that: 
it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer 
for conduct of its employees over which it has no control 
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and from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the 
major focus in determining whether or not the general 
rule should apply in a given case is on the benefit the 
employer receives and his control over the conduct. 
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.. 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989); 
accord Salt Lake City Corp.. 11 20. In State Tax Common v. Indus. Comm5n, 685 
P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984), this Court recognized that the rule should not be applied: 
where transportation was furnished by the employer to 
the benefit of the employer; where the employer requires 
the employee to use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the 
business; where the employee is injured while upon a 
"special errand53 or "special mission35 for the employer . . . 
State Tax Common v. Indus. Comm5n, 685 P.2d at 1053. 
Here, there is no dispute that on the day of the accident Ms. Stamper and 
Ms. Johnson were traveling from Toquerville to Mesquite "at [Mrs. Gilbert's] 
direction to finish the tasks necessary to complete the office move55 for Mrs. Gilbert 
and GDC, and had been provided a GDC corporate vehicle in order to complete 
the tasks. [R. at 73.] Thus Ms. Stamper was killed while on a "special errand55 or 
"special mission55 for her employer, namely, "to finish the tasks necessary to 
complete the office move55 in Mesquite. The accident occurred while Ms. Stamper 
and Ms. Johnson were engaged in an activity that was not only incidentally 
beneficial to their employer, it was directly beneficial, and they were within the 
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course and scope of employment notwithstanding Stampers5 "merely carpooling55 
characterization. Whitehead. 801 P.2d at 937; Salt Lake City Corp.. 11 20. 
2. The Fact That Ms. Stamper And Ms. Johnson Were Paid 
By Different Corporate Entities Has No Effect on Their 
Status As Co-employees Under the Fellow-servant Doctrine. 
The fact Ms. Stamper and Mrs. Johnson were paid by distinct corporate 
entities does not effect their status as fellow servants. In Bambrough, for example, 
the plaintiff was generally employed and paid by D&L Corporation as a truck 
driver. Bambrough, 552 P.2d at 1289. Defendant Bethers had contracted with 
D&L to pick up and transfer a load of wood paneling from Bethers5 business and 
to haul the load to Denver, Colorado. Id When the plaintiff arrived at Bethers5 
business, the plaintiff employee of D&L Corporation assisted an employee 
generally employed and paid by Bethers in transferring the load from Bethers5 
trailer onto the one owned by D&L Corporation. Id at 1289-90. During that 
task, the plaintiff was injured by Bethers5 employee so as to require the amputation 
of a leg. Id After discussing jury instructions concerning the right to control, this 
Court went on to affirm a judgment of dismissal based on the exclusive remedy 
provision, noting in pertinent part that the plaintiff and Bethers5 employee were in 
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the "same employment55 although they were paid by entirely separate companies. 
I d at 1293. 
Similarly and more recentiy, applying Utah law the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that employees paid by entirely different employers were fellow 
servants for purposes of the exclusive remedy provision in Goheen. In Goheen, the 
plaintiff was employed as a receiving clerk by Electro Controls, Inc. Goheen 32 
E3d at 1451. On the day of her accident, plaintiff was working on the loading 
dock and a driver employed by Yellow Freight Systems arrived to deliver a crate 
containing an Electro Controls product. Id Plaintiff assisted the Yellow Freight 
driver in unloading the crate, and while both parties were in the truck, the driver 
put the pallet jack under the crate and began to raise the jack while the plaintiff 
pushed the crate from behind. As the driver pulled the crate from the truck, the 
crate became unstable and fell off the pallet jack, injuring the plaintiff. Id 
In upholding the district court's summary judgment order dismissing 
plaintiffs complaint against Yellow Freight, the court noted that: 
the undisputed facts of the case indicate that Appellant 
Goheen participated with the Yellow Freight driver in the 
unloading of the crate so as to establish a fellow servant 
relationship between the Appellant and the driver as 
found by the district court. 
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Id at 1452 (citing Peterson v. Fowler, 493 P.2d 997 (Utah 1972); and 
Bambrough v. Bethers. 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976)). 
3. Similarly, the General Differences In Ms. Stamper's and Ms. 
Johnson's Skills And Job Duties Do Not Effect Their Status 
As Fellow Servants At The Time Of The Accident. 
Although Stampers emphasize the fact that Ms. Johnson and Ms. Stamper 
had generally different job skills and duties, this Court has found fellow servant 
relationships to exist in situations where the employees were not only paid and 
employed by different employers as discussed above, but where the employees in 
question had completely different job skills and job duties. See e.g., Bambrough, 
552 P.2d at 1293 (finding fellow servant relationship between a truck driver and 
fork lift operator); see also Goheen, 32 E3d 1450 (applying Utah law to find 
fellow servant relationship between truck driver and receiving clerk). Indeed, the 
central issue in determining whether employees are fellow servants is how closely 
the employees were working together on a common task. Thus, even if 
Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson had completely different job duties and skills, these 
facts are irrelevant to their status as fellow servants under Utah law. Id. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Ms. Johnson's and Ms. Stamper's 
working relationship was actually much closer than the relationship between the 
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employees in either the Bambrough or Goheen cases. For example, Ms. Johnson 
and Ms. Stamper routinely worked together on common tasks for their common 
employer, the Gilberts. There was "continuous crossover" between the corporate 
entities they worked for and job duties [R. at 66-67], and "[a]s for . . . working 
side by side, that's pretty much it, Steve, Cyndi, [Johnson], and Sharon 
[Stamper]." [R. at 126.] 
Most importantly, it is undisputed that when the accident occurred, 
Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were engaged in a common task for their common 
employer, GDC through Mrs. Gilbert. Mrs. Gilbert's uncontroverted testimony is 
that "[o]n that day, [Ms. Johnson] and [Ms. Stamper] were again coming from 
Toquerville to Mesquite at my direction to finish the tasks necessary to complete 
the [GDC] office move." [R. at 73.] Whether Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson had 
generally different skills and had different job duties is irrelevant to the 
determination that they were co-employees when the accident occurred. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE FELLOW SERVANT 
DOCTRINE IS APPROPRIATE WHEN MATERIAL FACTS ARE 
NOT CONTROVERTED. 
Finally, the Stampers cite Braegger v. Oregon S.L.R.R., 24 Utah 391, 396 
(1902) (noting that "whether two or more servants . . . are fellow servants usually 
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depends upon a variety of facts and is therefore a question of fact.35) , and argue that 
"the lower court improperly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment 
when disputed material facts exist.55 Aplts.5 Br. at 19-25. Stampers5 argument fails 
because more recent precedent amply demonstrates summary judgment is 
appropriate if material facts are not controverted, and Stampers can point to no 
material facts that are genuinely disputed. 
For example, in Peterson v. Fowler, 493 P.2d 997 (Utah 1972), this Court 
upheld the trial court5s determination that two employees were fellow servants on 
summary judgment and as a matter of law. See Peterson, 493 P2d at 1000. 
Although there was a trial and a dispute about jury instructions in Bambrough, this 
Court went beyond those issues to cite Peterson v. Fowler with approval and to 
imply that a fellow servant relationship existed as a matter of law "quite aside from 
the above discussion.55 See Bambrough, 552 P.2d at 1293. And finally, in Goheen 
the 10th Circuit upheld the federal district court's application of Utah law to 
determine a fellow servant relationship existed as a matter of law on summary 
judgment. Goheen, 32 F.3d at 1452. 
Thus the question of whether a fellow servant relationship exists is not 
automatically a question for the jury as the Stampers argue. Indeed, as the rule 
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states, summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact55 and "the moving party is entided to a judgment as a matter of law.55 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Accordingly where the material facts regarding whether 
two employees are fellow servants are undisputed, the question is appropriately 
resolved on summary judgment. See e.g., Peterson, 493 P2d at 1000; Goheen, 32 
E3d at 1452. 
Here, Stampers argue conclusorily that there are disputes of fact concerning 
1) the extent to which there was "continuous crossover55 between the two 
employees because of their "widely varying skill sets (although they are forced to 
admit there was some "crossover55 (Aplts.5 Br. at 21-22); 2) the extent to which the 
two employees may have been involved in "distinct tasks55 when they arrived in 
Mesquite on the day of the accident (id. at 23-24); and 3) the extent Stamper 
could have exercised "any meaningful influence55 on Ms. Johnson with respect to 
"proper caution55 or "their mutual safety55 because a jury could find there was 
nothing Ms. Stamper could have done in the "sudden and unanticipated rolling 
over of a vehicle.55 Id at 24-25. None of these constitute genuine disputes of 
material fact sufficient to overturn the district court's order of summary judgment. 
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First, as set forth above, neither the extent of past "continuous cross-over55 
nor the two employees5 "widely varying skill sets55 is determinative. As the 
Peterson, Bambrough and Goheen cases teach, whatever past experience the 
employees had working together and whether they usually performed different tasks 
does not prevent a finding that the two were co-employees on the occasion in 
question. 
Nor are the other "disputes55 Stampers allude to material given the facts that 
they cannot controvert. The undisputed evidence is that on the day in question 
and at the time of the accident, the employees5 supervisor, Mrs. Gilbert, who was 
preparing for depositions in Mesquite as corporate counsel for GDC, had directed 
the two employees to travel in a GDC company vehicle from Toquerville to 
Mesquite to complete an office move necessary for GDCs benefit. During the 
travel, which is when and where the accident occurred, the employees where 
engaged together in the "task55 of traveling to Mesquite. [R. at 73.] 
In so doings and as set forth above, they were situated "in such personal 
relations that they can exercise an influence upon each other promotive of proper 
caution in respect of their mutual safety55 Peterson, 493 P2d at 1000. They were 
either "directly operating with each other in the particular business at hand,55 or in 
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"such co-association that they55 could "exercise an influence upon each other to use 
proper caution.55 Id. 
The fellow servant doctrine does not require more. Thus whether, when 
they arrived at Mesquite one or the other of the two employees might have 
performed some task benefitting another of the closely held corporate entities, or 
whether, in the instant the car started rolling Ms. Stamper could have influenced 
the outcome, are not determinative facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts establish that Ms. Stamper and Ms. Johnson were 
fellow servants in the "same employment55 at the time of the accident. At the 
direction and control of Cyndi Gilbert, they were both engaged to finish the tasks 
necessary to complete a move into the GDC office for use by GDC5s counsel in 
upcoming depositions. In order to complete their mutual tasks, Stamper and 
Johnson were situated together in a GDC vehicle together and in such a 
relationship that they could exercise influence on each other to promote proper 
caution in handling the vehicle, seat belt use, etc., so as to affect their mutual 
safety. Under such circumstances, the Workers5 Compensation Act provides 
Plaintiffs5 exclusive remedy for the accident and the district court correctly ruled 
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Stampers' Complaint here is barred. Peterson, 493 P2d at 1000. See also 
Bambrough, 552 P.2d at 1289; Goheen, 32 E3d at 1451-53. 
Respectfully submitted this 2 ^ day of June, 2009. 
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